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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by Roland F. L. Hall*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys decisions addressing appellate law and procedure
handed down by the Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2008 and
May 31, 2009.1 The cases discussed fall into the following categories:
(1) appellate jurisdiction, (2) preserving the record, and (3) miscellaneous
cases of interest.
II.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Selecting the Correct Appeal Procedure

A.

Several cases during the survey period dealt with the sometimes
difficult determination of which appeal procedure should be used. For
example, in Davis v. Deutsche Bank National TRust Co.,2 the plaintiff
creditor-the assignee of a mortgage company-brought an action
against the defendant debtors, seeking foreclosure on property owned by
the defendants' mother that was used as collateral for a loan. The
plaintiff also sought damages for bad faith, claiming that when the
defendants executed the security deed, the defendants stated they were
the owners of the property. The defendants' mother sought to intervene
in the suit, and the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment
against the defendants. In a single order, the trial court denied the

* Partner in the law firm of Autry, Horton & Cole, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of
Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994); Senior
Managing Editor (1993-1994). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
1. For analysis of Georgia appellate practice and procedure law during the prior survey
period, see Roland F. L. Hall, Appellate Practiceand Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 21 (2008).
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285 Ga. 22, 673 S.E.2d 221 (2009).
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motion to intervene and granted partial summary judgment to the
plaintiff.3
The defendants' mother filed a direct appeal from the order denying
her motion to intervene. The plaintiffs contended that the appeal should
be dismissed for failure to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures.4
The Georgia Supreme Court noted that although the grant of a partial
summary judgment ordinarily may be directly appealed pursuant to
section 9-11-56(h) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),
in a multi-party case the appeal may only be filed by one with standing
to pursue it-the losing party.6 The court held that the mere fact that
the trial court joined its ruling on the motion to intervene with the
ruling granting the partial summary judgment to the plaintiff did not
make the defendants' mother a party to the suit or confer standing on
her to appeal the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff.7
Because there was no order from which the defendants' mother could file
a direct appeal, the appeal was dismissed.8 However, the court noted
that under the procedures of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a),9 the defendants'
mother could have sought an interlocutory appeal.'0
In American Medical Security Group, Inc. v. Parker," the plaintiffs
brought a motion for contempt against the defendants for abuse of the
discovery process. As a discovery sanction, the trial court struck the
defendants' answer and entered a default judgment against the
defendants for liability. When the defendants filed a notice of appeal,
the plaintiffs argued that the order was a discovery order that was not
subject to direct appeal, and the trial court dismissed the notice of
appeal. The defendants appealed from the dismissal of the notice of
appeal. The Georgia Court of Appeals also dismissed the appeal, ruling
that a trial court's order dismissing an unauthorized interlocutory
appeal is itself an interlocutory order and that the defendants failed to
comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures when appealing the
order. 12

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 23, 673 S.E.2d at 222.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h) (2006).
Davis, 285 Ga. at 23-24, 673 S.E.2d at 222.
Id. at 24, 673 S.E.2d at 222-23.
Id., 673 S.E.2d at 223.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) (1995 & Supp. 2009).
Davis, 285 Ga. at 24, 673 S.E.2d at 223.
284 Ga. 102, 663 S.E.2d 697 (2008).
Id. at 102-03, 663 S.E.2d at 698.
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The Georgia Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition for
certiorari. 3 The supreme court initially determined that whether the
court of appeals erred in dismissing the defendants' appeal turned on
whether the trial court's order providing discovery sanctions was directly
appealable because a trial court's order dismissing a properly ified direct
appeal is itself subject to a direct appeal.14
The defendants argued that the order providing sanctions was directly
appealable because the trial court in essence had found that the
defendants committed an act of contempt by violating the discovery
order. Accordingly, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a), the order should
have been considered directly appealable. Further, the defendants
argued that the order was not an order imposing discovery sanctions
because under the circumstances such an order would not be directly
appealable.15
The supreme court held that the sanction of dismissing the defendants'
answer and entering a default judgment could not be considered a
punishment for either criminal or civil contempt.16 Because the order
was unconditional and was not intended to coerce compliance with the
prior discovery order, the court reasoned that the order did not
constitute punishment for civil contempt. 7 The supreme court determined that although the trial court had labeled the defendants' violation
of the discovery order as an act of contempt, the defendants' appeal was
not a contempt case and was thus not directly appealable because the
trial court did not impose punishment for criminal contempt or attempt
to coerce compliance with the prior discovery order." The supreme
court stated that to hold otherwise would "permit direct appeals of all
interlocutory discovery orders that require a finding of wilfulness," and
might cause a trial court to forgo issuing sanctions to avoid the
significant delay in the trial caused by a direct appeal." Therefore, the
supreme court held that the court of appeals properly dismissed the
defendants' appeal.2 °
Also of interest in this case is the concurring opinion of Justice
Benham, in which he discussed the expansion by the appellate courts of

13. Id. at 103, 663 S.E.2d at 698.
14. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 698-99; see alsoAzar v. Baird, 232 Ga. 81,82-83,205 S.E.2d 273,
273-74 (1974).
15. Parker,284 Ga. at 103-04, 663 S.E.2d at 699.
16. Id. at 105, 663 S.E.2d at 700.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 107, 663 S.E.2d at 701-02.
20. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 702.
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the trial courts' authority to dismiss a notice of appeal.2 1 As Justice
Benham noted, the trial courts only have statutory authority, pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c),22 to dismiss appeals in circumstances when
"there has been an unreasonable delay in filing the transcript or in
transmitting the record to the appellate court."' However, a series of
decisions by the court of appeals and the supreme court allowed the trial
courts to dismiss appeals on other grounds, including the grounds that
(1) the judgment was not yet appealable,24 (2) the question presented
had become moot,25 and (3) the notice of appeal was untimely.26 In
contrast, Justice Benham noted that the appellate courts had restricted
the trial courts' authority to dismiss appeals in other cases.27 Further,
Justice Benham noted that the expansion of the trial courts' ability to
dismiss appeals had resulted in additional work for the appellate courts,
such as in the instant case when the trial court's dismissal of the appeal
on the ground that the decision was not then appealable required review
by both the court of appeals and the supreme court.2" Remarking that
"[iut is not supposed to be that difficult," Justice Benham called for a
return to abiding by the statutory grant of authority to the trial courts
29
to dismiss appeals.
In Rhymes v. East Atlanta Church of God, Inc.,3 ° the plaintiff church
brought an action for damages against the defendants along with a
petition to quiet title. A special master conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the quiet title claim and filed a report with the trial court
finding in favor of the plaintiff church. The defendants filed exceptions
to the special master's report and also filed pleadings seeking a jury
trial. The trial court adopted the special master's report and decided
that the plaintiff church held title to the property. In a separate order,
the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the pleadings
requesting a jury trial because the request was not made prior to the

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 108, 663 S.E.2d at 702 (Benham, J., concurring).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c) (1995 & Supp. 2009).
Parker,284 Ga. at 108, 663 S.E.2d at 702 (Benham, J., concurring).
Id. (citing Jones v. Singleton, 253 Ga. 41, 316 S.E.2d 154 (1984)).

25. Id. at 109, 663 S.E.2d at 702 (citing Attwell v. Lane Co., 182 Ga. App. 813, 357
S.E.2d 142 (1987)).

26. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 702-03 (citing Crumbley v. Wyant, 183 Ga. App. 802, 360 S.E.2d
276 (1987)).
27. Id. at 109-10, 663 S.E.2d at 703 (citing numerous supreme court and court of
appeals cases).

28. Id. at 110, 663 S.E.2d at 703.
29. Id.
30. 284 Ga. 145, 663 S.E.2d 670 (2008).
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special master's hearing. The defendants subsequently filed a notice of
direct appeal.3 1
The defendants contended that a direct appeal could be filed pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1), which allows a direct appeal to be taken from
all final judgments.32 The supreme court held that because the case
involved multiple claims and "[tihe trial court neither expressly
determined that there [was] no just reason for delay nor expressly
directed the entry of final judgment," there was no final judgment from
which the defendants could take a direct appeal.33 Although the trial
court's order adopting the special master's report was designated "Final
Judgment and Order," the supreme court held that such designation was
not controlling and that the order did not adjudicate the plaintiff's other
claims.' The court also overruled the decision of the court of appeals
in Re-Max Executives, Inc. v. Wallace35 to the extent the court of
appeals held that the designation of a judgment as "final" is controlling.36 Because the defendants were not entitled to file a direct appeal
and failed to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures, the supreme
court dismissed the appeal.37
In Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Canas,38
another case examining the final judgment rule, the plaintiff, a patient
with HIV/AIDS, brought tort claims against the board of regents. The
board contended that it was immune from suit on the basis of sovereign
immunity. The trial court denied the board's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's administrative failure to warn claim and held that the board
was not immune from suit on sovereign immunity grounds. 9 Based on
the defendant's failure to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b),4 ° the plaintiff moved to dismiss the
appeal.4 1
The court of appeals held that the order appealed from, the trial
court's order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, was not a final

31. Id. at 145, 663 S.E.2d at 671-72.
32. Id. at 145-46, 663 S.E.2d at 672.

33. Id. at 146, 663 S.E.2d at 672.
34. Id.
35.
36.

205 Ga. App. 170, 421 S.E.2d 540 (1992).
Rhymes, 284 Ga. at 147, 663 S.E.2d at 672; see Wallace, 205 Ga. App. at 171, 421

S.E.2d at 541.
37. Rhymes, 284 Ga. at 148, 663 S.E.2d at 673.
38. 295 Ga. App. 505, 672 S.E.2d 471 (2009).

39. Id. at 505, 672 S.E.2d at 472-73.
40.
41.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (1995 & Supp. 2009).
Canas, 295 Ga. App. at 505-06, 672 S.E.2d at 473.
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judgment and was not an order made directly appealable by statute.42
Generally, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over a direct appeal
filed from an interlocutory ruling.4 But a narrow exception applies,
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, when an order "'resolve[s] an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action'" and
is "'effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."' 4 The
court of appeals held that because sovereign immunity is more than a
"mere defense to liability, and is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial," an order denying a motion to dismiss based
upon a conclusive determination of no sovereign immunity falls within
the collateral order doctrine.4 The court of appeals thus had jurisdiction over the defendant's direct appeal.46
Jurisdictionof Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
Although the supreme court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional issues, in certain limited circumstances the court of
appeals can review constitutional questions.47 In City of Decatur v.
DeKalb County," which involved a claimed breach of an intergovernmental agreement, the supreme court indicated that the exception under
which the court of appeals can review constitutional questions is to be
narrowly construed.49 In that case, several cities in DeKalb County,
Georgia, brought suit against the county on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement for the expenditure of certain tax revenues. The
county sought summary judgment on the basis that the agreement
violated a state constitutional provision regarding intergovernmental
agreements. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that
issues of fact remained regarding the type of agreement at issue.5 °

B.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 506, 672 S.E.2d at 473.
44. Id. at 507, 672 S.E.2d at 473 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468-69 (1978)); see also Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748, 653 S.E.2d 713, 716 (2007).
45. Canas, 295 Ga. App. at 507, 672 S.E.2d at 473-74. Because the trial court had
conclusively determined that the defendant was not immune from suit on the basis of
sovereign immunity, the court of appeals distinguished State v. Gober, 229 Ga. App. 700,
494 S.E.2d 724 (1997). Canas, 295 Ga. App. at 507 n.8, 672 S.E.2d at 474 n.8. In Gober
the court of appeals held that an order denying the State of Georgia's motion for dismissal
was not directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the trial court had
not made a final conclusion regarding sovereign immunity. 229 Ga. App. at 700-01, 494
S.E.2d at 725.
46. Canas, 295 Ga. App. at 507, 672 S.E.2d at 474.
47. See Watson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 635, 637, 642 S.E.2d 328, 330 (2007).
48. 284 Ga. 434, 668 S.E.2d 247 (2008).
49. See id. at 436-37, 668 S.E.2d at 250-51.
50. Id. at 434-35, 668 S.E.2d at 249.
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On appeal, the court of appeals held that it had jurisdiction because
the case required only the application of an unambiguous constitutional
provision and was thus not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
supreme court. The court of appeals then construed the constitutional
provision as not authorizing the agreement between the parties and
reversed.5 '
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that
it had merely applied an unambiguous constitutional provision to the
facts of the case.5" The supreme court concluded that because the court
of appeals had interpreted the term services as used in the constitutional
provision and none of the supreme court decisions construing the
provision had interpreted the term services, the court of appeals had in
fact applied its own construction of the provision to the facts before
it-an act that was outside its jurisdiction.' The supreme court thus
vacated the judgment of the court of appeals.' 4 The supreme court also
noted that the trial court had not specifically ruled upon the constitutional issue and, thus, remanded the case to the court of appeals to
examine whether the trial court erred in denying the county's motion for
summary judgment.55
C. Miscellaneous JurisdictionalIssues
In GMC Group, Inc. v. Harsco Corp.,' the court of appeals considered
the issue of what constitutes a final judgment for purposes of triggering
the time limit for filing a notice of appeal.5 7 A default judgment was
filed with the clerk in October 2007, but a civil disposition form was not
filed until May 2008. The appellant did not fie the notice of appeal
until May

2 0 0 8 .'

The appellant relied upon O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b), 59

which provides that the filing with the clerk of a signed judgment
together with the fully completed civil case disposition form constitutes
the entry of judgment,' and argued that its notice of appeal was timely
1

filed.6

51.

Id. at 437, 668 S.E.2d at 250.

52. Id.
53.

Id., 668 S.E.2d at 251.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 438, 668 S.E.2d at 251.
Id.
293 Ga. App. 707, 667 S.E.2d 916 (2008).
Id. at 707, 667 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 707-08, 667 S.E.2d at 917-18.

59. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) (2006).
60. Id.
61.

GMC Group, Inc., 293 Ga. App. at 708, 667 S.E.2d at 918.
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The court of appeals disagreed, 62 citing a provision of the Appellate
Practice Act,63 which states that filing a signed judgment with the clerk
constitutes the entry of a judgment for purposes of the Act.' The court
of appeals held that the specific section of the Appellate Practice Act
addressing what triggers the running of the thirty-day period for filing
a notice of appeal' prevailed over the more general provisions of the
Civil Practice Act." Accordingly, the court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the notice of appeal was
untimely filed."
III.

PRESERVING THE RECORD

In Byrd v. Rachaman," an action for breach of a promissory note, the
defendant failed to serve timely responses to the plaintiff's requests for
admissions and subsequently moved to withdraw the admissions. The
trial court held a hearing on the motion, which it denied, and subsequently granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the
basis of the matters deemed admitted by operation of law. On appeal,
the defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to withdraw the admissions and that without the admissions, summary
judgment could not have been granted.6 9 Because no transcript of the
hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his admissions was
included in the record on appeal, the court of appeals held it was
required to assume the trial court was authorized to conclude that the
defendant failed to set forth the proper legal basis for his motion to
withdraw his admissions.7" Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
the defendant could not show any basis for reversing the summary
judgment order.7
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES OF INTEREST

Although trial courts generally may not award litigation expenses for72
appellate proceedings, the court of appeals in In re Estate of Zeigler

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-30 to -51 (1995 & Supp. 2009).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-31 (1995).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38 (1995).
O,C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to -133 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
GMC Group, Inc., 293 Ga. App. at 710, 667 S.E.2d at 919.
294 Ga. App. 869, 670 S.E.2d 458 (2008).
Id. at 869, 670 S.E.2d at 458-59.
Id. at 870, 670 S.E.2d at 459.
Id.
295 Ga. App. 156, 671 S.E.2d 218 (2008).
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explored a limited exception to this general rule.73 In that case, the
removal of an executrix from an estate had been affirmed in a prior
appeal. Subsequently, the probate court was asked to decide whether
the former executrix and her attorney should pay litigation expenses to
one of the estate's beneficiaries. The beneficiary contended in part that
the former executrix and her attorney had unnecessarily prolonged the
proceedings by filing multiple continuances and appeals. The probate
court entered an order awarding the beneficiary damages and litigation
expenses, including attorney fees.74 The probate court used O.C.G.A.
77
76
§ 9-15-14(b), 75 O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, and O.C.G.A. § 53-12-193(a)(4)
to justify its award of litigation expenses.7 s
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that neither O.C.G.A. § 9-1514(b) nor O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 authorized the probate court to award
expenses of litigation for appellate proceedings because both statutes
address conduct occurring at the trial court level.79 However, the court
of appeals held that O.C.G.A. § 53-12-193(a)(4) did support such an
award.' The court of appeals held that the statute allowed recovery
of litigation expenses incurred when a beneficiary brings an action for
breach of a trustee's duties to the beneficiary and that such expenses
could include those incurred before an appellate court and a trial
court.8
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that because the
beneficiary's petition for the executrix's removal was based on the
executrix's breach of duty to the estate, the probate court could award
expenses incurred by the beneficiary in defending the executrix's appeals
of such removal.8"
In Hunt v. Thomas, 3 the plaintiff father-in-law brought suit against
the defendant son-in-law for the return of an investment in real
property. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on all issues except attorney fees. Although the defendant
requested an oral hearing, the trial court issued its order without
holding a hearing.'

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 156, 158, 671 S.E.2d at 222-23.
Id. at 157, 671 S.E.2d at 222.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 2009).
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-193(a)(4) (1997 & Supp. 2009).
In re Estate of Zeigler, 295 Ga. App. at 160-61, 671 S.E.2d at 225.
Id. at 161, 671 S.E.2d at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
296 Ga. App. 505, 675 S.E.2d 256 (2009).
Id. at 505-06, 675 S.E.2d at 257.
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On appeal, the defendant contended that the order granting partial
summary judgment should be reversed because of the trial court's failure
to hold a hearing.' As noted by the court of appeals, a party timely
requesting oral argument on a motion for summary judgment is
absolutely entitled to a hearing, and the failure to grant a hearing is
never harmless error.86 However, the court of appeals held that it did
not have to rely on these principles and that the real issue was whether
a party could ever waive the failure to hold the hearing by his conduct. 7 Relying on the well-established principle that at the appellate
level a party "'cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his
own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing,'" the court of
appeals held that the defendant's failure to object or notify the trial
court of the failure to hold a hearing resulted in a waiver of his right to
raise the issue on appeal.89
In Blackmon v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, Inc.," the plaintiff
brought a medical malpractice action against the defendants in her
capacity as legal guardian of her grandchild. The defendants moved for
partial summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff was not the
proper party to bring the action.9 ' The state court denied the motion,
purportedly in the exercise of its equitable power to allow an exception
to O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2(a),9 2 which provides that only the surviving spouse
can bring a wrongful death claim.93 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the state court did not possess the equitable power held by
a superior court to make an exception to the statute. 4 Although the
plaintiff sought to have the court of appeals require transfer of the case
to the superior court, the court of appeals held that (1) the plaintiff had
not requested transfer in the state court and (2) Georgia Uniform
Superior Court Rule 19.1(A),9 5 which provides for transfer,' was not
applicable because the rule only applies when subject matter jurisdiction

85. Id. at 506, 675 S.E.2d at 257.
86. Id., 675 S.E.2d at 258 (citing Bennett v. McDonald, 238 Ga. App. 414, 415, 518
S.E.2d 912, 914 (1999); Dixon v. McClain, 204 Ga. App. 531, 531, 420 S.E.2d 66, 66-67
(1992)).
87. Id.
88.

Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Wyatt, 192 Ga. App. 127, 129, 384 S.E.2d 227, 229 (1989)).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 507, 675 S.E.2d at 258.
284 Ga. 369, 667 S.E.2d 348 (2008).
Id. at 369-70, 667 S.E.2d at 348-49.
O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2(a) (2000).
Id.; Blackmon, 284 Ga. at 370-71, 667 S.E.2d at 349.
Blackmon, 284 Ga. at 370, 667 S.E.2d at 349.

95.

GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 19.1(A).

96. Id.

20091
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is lacking, and the issue before the state court concerned standing, not
subject matter jurisdiction.9"
The supreme court granted certiorari and held that the court of
appeals should have vacated the state court's ruling and remanded with
direction to transfer the case to superior court.98 The supreme court
held that the court of appeals was required to do so by article VI, section
1, paragraph 8 of the Georgia Constitution," which provides that "[any
court shall transfer to the appropriate court in the state any civil case
in which it determines that jurisdiction or venue lies elsewhere.""°
Although the court of appeals held that the request for partial summary
judgment was based on the plaintiff's lack of standing to sue rather than
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the supreme court held that (1) the
constitutional provision referred to "jurisdiction" generally, and the
concept of "standing" fell under "jurisdiction" in the general sense; and
(2) the purpose of the constitutional provision was to "prevent parties
from being penalized when their attorneys ... make a mistake regarding
the complex ...

rules that govern jurisdiction and venue and... file a

case in the wrong court."" 1
During the survey period, the court of appeals issued several decisions
addressing violations of its rules. For example, in de Castro v.
Durrell,02 the plaintiffs, owners of subdivision lots, brought suit
against the defendants, owners of an adjoining lot, based on an alleged
easement in a soccer field. 0 3 The plaintiffs moved to strike portions
of the defendants' answers on the basis that the defendants set forth
spurious defenses solely for the purpose of delay. The trial court,
however, denied the motion to strike.1" On appeal, the appellants,
citing "Rule 11, "'0' argued that the trial court erred in denying the
motion to strike. 1" However, citing Georgia Court of Appeals Rule
25(c)(2), 0 7 the court of appeals deemed the claim of error abandoned,

97. Blackmon, 284 Ga. at 370, 667 S.E.2d at 349.
98. Id. at 371-72, 667 S.E.2d at 350.
99. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 8; Blackmon, 284 Ga. at 371, 667 S.E.2d at 350.
100. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 8.
101. Blackmon, 284 Ga. at 371, 667 S.E.2d at 350.
102.

103.
104.
105.
statute
106.

295 Ga. App. 194, 671 S.E.2d 244 (2008).

Id. at 194-95, 671 S.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 204, 671 S.E.2d at 252-53.
Id., 671 S.E.2d at 253. The court stated that it would "not speculate upon which
or court rule" the appellants meant. Id.
Id.
107. GA. CT. APP. R. 25(cX2).
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holding that it was the appellants' obligation to cite specific authority in
support of their enumeration of error. 0 8
Although failure to properly set forth enumerations of error holds the
risk of the court of appeals declining to consider issues on appeal, in
Biederbeck v. Marbut,'° the court of appeals demonstrated its willingness to overlook technical violations when the intent of the appellant is
obvious."0 In that case, the appellants stated in their first enumeration of error that the trial court erred by not striking the appellee's
quantum meruit claim and by requiring the appellee to proceed on the
written contract between the parties. The appellee moved to dismiss the
enumeration of error because the appellants had not filed a motion in
the trial court to strike the quantum meruit claim."' The court of
appeals determined that the appellees had moved for a directed verdict
on the quantum meruit claim and had sought a motion for new trial on
the same ground, and the trial court had denied these motions." 2
Based on its authority to consider the record in discerning what errors
the appellant was attempting to make, the court of appeals concluded
that it would address the trial court's ruling regarding the quantum
meruit claim."'
In Ruskin v. AAF-McQuay, Inc.,"' the parties entered into a settlement agreement but were unable to finalize some of the agreement's
terms. The trial court referred the dispute to a special master, who
resolved all issues, and the trial court adopted the special master's
decisions, entering a judgment enforcing the settlement agreement. In
a prior appeal, the court of appeals had concluded that the settlement
agreement was enforceable, and the trial court subsequently found one
of the parties in contempt for failing to follow the order adopting the
settlement agreement. "' Another appeal was filed, and the court of
appeals determined that the appellant raised essentially the same
arguments as in the first appeal."8 Noting that the appellant's actions
had delayed enforcement of the settlement for nearly four years, the
court of appeals held that the appeal was "clearly an appeal for purposes of delay,""' and on the basis of Georgia Court of Appeals Rule

108.
109.
110.
111.
112,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

de Castro, 295 Ga. App. at 204, 671 S.E.2d at 253.
294 Ga. App. 799, 670 S.E.2d 483 (2008).
See id. at 800-01, 670 S.E.2d at 486.
Id. at 800, 670 S.E.2d at 485-86.
Id. at 800-01, 670 S.E.2d at 486.
Id.
294 Ga. App. 842, 670 S.E.2d 517 (2008).
Id. at 842-43, 670 S.E.2d at 518-19.
Id., 670 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 844, 670 S.E.2d at 520.
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15(b), " 8 imposed penalties of $2000 against the appellants and $2000
against their appellate counsel. 1 9

118.
119.

GA. CT. APP. R. 15(b).
Ruskin, 294 Ga. App. at 844-45, 670 S.E.2d at 520.

